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Microfi nance Lifespans: A Study 
of Attrition and Exclusion in 
Self-Help Groups in India*
Introduction
Microfi nance is often advocated as a solution to multiple social problems. Productive investments fi nanced by loans can bring 
households out of poverty, reduce income and wealth disparities, and groups 
can serve as forums for collective action to improve gender relations and 
local governance. Over the last few years, savings and credit groups have also 
helped manage some important social programs of the Indian government, 
such as the distribution of foodgrains and school meals in state-run primary 
schools.
There are two principal institutional forms through which group lending 
takes place in the microfi nance sector of most countries. In the fi rst, spe-
cialized institutions organize potential lenders into groups. Group compos-
ition may be determined by random factors, as in the case of FINCA in Peru, 
or the matching preferences of members as in the case of Grameen Bank.1 
These lending institutions are intimately and permanently involved with 
* We thank the PRADAN team for many useful discussions and for their support in 
facilitating data collection; Sandeep Goyal, Sanjay Prasad, Amit Kumar, Rahul Sharan, and 
Saurabh Singhal for research assistance, and to FUCID (Fondation Universitaire de Cooperation 
Internationale et de Developpement, Namur,), and the Action de Recherches Concertees 
program of the French speaking community in Belgium for fi nancial support. The authors 
would also like to thank Mr Bhupendra Mehta for drafting the maps in this paper.
1. See Karlan (2007) for a description of group operations in FINCA and chapter 4 of 
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) for Grameen Bank lending practices.
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their members—they form groups, set interest rates and fi nes, and their re-
presentatives are usually present in group meetings.
An alternative model is one in which several loosely connected institu-
tions are involved with a given group of borrowers. Government and non-
government agencies form credit groups, the groups determine their own 
rules for saving and lending, and some of these groups subsequently borrow 
from commercial banks. Microcredit is just a fraction of the loan portfolio 
of these banks who see it as a way of meeting their social responsibilities. 
This is the dominant institutional form in Indian microfi nance, in terms of 
both outreach and total loan disbursements.
The present structure of the microfi nance sector in India emerged in the 
early 1990s when the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued guidelines to 
nationalized commercial banks encouraging them to lend to informal self-
help groups (SHGs). Since then, such groups have been actively promoted 
by a number of different agencies and the National Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (NABARD) has provided banks with subsidized credit 
for lending to SHGs.2 Offi cial statistics currently report over two and a half 
million groups and 32 million households in them.3 Most of these groups 
are composed entirely of women (NABARD, 2006:38).
In spite of the phenomenal growth in the number of SHGs and total 
loans advanced to them, there is little systematic evidence on their internal 
functioning. In part, this is due to the nature of governance within the sec-
tor. Statistics on Indian SHGs have emerged because the organizations 
promoting these groups provide their donors an account of the number of 
new groups created and because commercial banks are required to report 
their lending to the Reserve Bank. In neither case are details on the uses of 
funds or their distribution within a group reported. We therefore know little 
about group demographics, about whether groups, once formed, continue to 
function effectively or how many members leave groups that they initially 
joined. This paper attempts to fi ll this informational gap by using survey data 
on SHGs created during the period 1998–2006. We describe the survival of 
groups and members within groups, document group activities, and estimate 
the determinants of group and member duration using an econometric 
survival model.
Our data come from a survey of 1,102 rural SHGs and the 16,800 women 
who were members of these groups at some point during the period 1998–
2006. We consider all groups formed by PRADAN, [a non-government 
2. See Reserve Bank of India (1991) and National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (1992) for the original policy statements.
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organization (NGO) that has actively promoted SHGs since the start of the 
NABARD program] in the districts of Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj in northern 
Orissa and Raigarh district in the newly formed state of Chhattisgarh in 
central India. Groups are engaged in a variety of collective activities but 
saving and credit does seem the most important.3 Almost all groups we sur-
veyed had made small loans to their members and 68 percent of them had 
received at least one loan from a commercial bank. Each borrower re-
ceived about Rs. 2,200 per year from internal group funds. For groups with 
at least one bank linkage, 83 percent of members in the group received some 
part of this loan and the average amount received by these members was 
Rs. 2,189 per year.4 Although loans provided by some specialized micro-
fi nance institutions are often larger, these SHG loans are sizable as a fraction 
of local earnings and, for women who received both group loans and banks 
loans, total borrowing from these two sources corresponds to roughly two 
months of labor earnings at the minimum wage in these areas.5
The Groups do undertake activities not directly related to credit. About 
10 percent were involved in the preparation of school meals, 3 percent ad-
ministered state programs to distribute subsidized foodgrains and about 
half of them had, at some point, been involved in resolving family or village 
confl icts. They also frequently reported helping members during periods 
of personal distress. These groups therefore seem to play a role in promoting 
solidarity networks in the community. The data we have collected so far do 
not allow us to investigate these activities in much detail. In terms of the 
fractions of groups and members involved however, they appear secondary.
We estimate models of both group and member duration and fi nd that 
factors behind group survival are quite different from those affecting mem-
ber longevity. The maximum level of education in the group is important 
for its survival, perhaps because some educated members are needed to 
facilitate transactions and ensure that group accounts are accurate. The 
presence of other SHGs in the same village also has a positive effect on the 
duration. It may be that a dense cluster of groups allows for the sharing of 
3. See Table 8.
4. Our survey did not explicitly ask members about the bank credit received each year. 
This number has therefore been computed using the total amount received by members from 
bank sources and dividing it by the number of years that the group has been active since fi rst 
bank linkage.
5. The minimum wages for each sector are determined by the Indian states under the 
Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Central Government issues guidelines regarding these 
and currently recommends a fl oor of Rs. 66 per day. Agricultural workers who are privately 
employed typically receive about two-thirds of this amount.
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costs and ideas or instills in members the desire to survive, compete, and 
be part of a larger network.
Based on a large literature that points to the importance of social 
heterogeneity in collective action, we explore whether such heterogeneity 
matters for the average duration of groups and of members within groups. 
For each surveyed member, we recorded both their individual caste or jati 
and the offi cial category to which this caste belongs. Our fractionalization 
measures are a function of the shares of group members that belong to each 
caste. There are over a hundred different castes in our surveyed area and 
all four of the offi cial categories are present—the Scheduled Tribes (ST), 
Scheduled Castes (SC), Other Backward Classes (OBC), and the residual 
category of Forward Castes (FC). We fi nd that commonly used measures 
of fractionalization and social heterogeneity based on these classifi cations 
do not have systematic effects on group survival but they do explain the de-
parture of individuals from groups. Heterogeneity matters even within 
broad caste categories, suggesting that the offi cial classifi cation fails to fully 
capture the relevant social hierarchy. Members from traditionally disad-
vantaged groups, especially poor communities within the ST, are the most 
vulnerable to group heterogeneity. In addition to heterogeneity, lower levels 
of education, smaller landholdings and the absence of relatives within the 
group are all associated with greater exit of member. We fi nd that most 
of the differences in the duration of membership within a group between 
Chhattisgarh and Orissa can be attributed to characteristics of groups in 
these areas and regional variations in duration are negligible once these 
characteristics are incorporated into our model.
Our results suggest that it is problematic to evaluate the success of micro-
fi nance interventions based on conventionally reported coverage fi gures be-
cause these fi gures do not adequately account for attrition. The formation of 
groups is much better recorded in offi cial data than their closure and groups, 
rather than their members, are the unit of analysis. As a result, estimates of 
microfi nance outreach are infl ated because they are based on the initial and 
not the actual membership of SHGs.
One might argue that the attrition rates observed in our data are not 
particularly high compared with many government programs. Even groups 
that are no longer active functioned for a little over two years and members 
that left functioning groups stayed for an average of one and a half years. 
Besides, even if attrition rates were higher, it would be diffi cult to derive 
their welfare implications without more information on the types of credit 
contracts that these members have access to upon leaving their group. It is 
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possible, and perhaps desirable, that SHGs are an intermediate stage in 
the process of fi nancial integration of these households and that members 
leave groups when individual contracts with formal fi nancial institutions 
become sustainable.
We fi nd, however, that attrition rates are systematically related to meas-
ures of social disadvantage. It is predominantly the poorer and socially 
marginalized communities that leave the SHG network, and this makes it 
unlikely that women moving out of SHGs enter individual contracts with 
lending institutions. It also means that some of those in desperate need of 
credit cannot obtain it from within this sector. An additional concern is 
that lending by commercial banks to SHGs is considered priority sector 
lending by the banking system and may therefore crowd out other lending. 
Disbursements by commercial banks to SHGs were 29 percent of all direct 
bank credit to small farmers in 2004–05 and SHG credit has been rapidly 
rising since.6
To arrive at concrete policy prescriptions for this sector, more informa-
tion is needed about the fi nancial opportunities available to members once 
they leave this sector and the extent to which SHG lending substitutes for 
other types of lending to the poor. Although the duration of membership is 
only one, admittedly crude, measure of the performance of the microfi nance 
sector, our study suggests that survey data on the histories of members and 
groups in this sector is critical to an assessment of Indian microfi nance.
We provide a brief institutional history of the microfi nance sector in 
India in Section 2. Our survey data, some summary statistics, and empirical 
methods are described in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. Results are pre-
sented in Section 5 and are followed by some refl ections on their implica-
tions for policy.
Microfi nance Institutions in India
Many detailed accounts on the history of rural banking in India are avail-
able. The All India Rural Credit Survey in 1954 was the fi rst major study 
of household access to credit. It found that the rural poor were heavily 
6. The loan disbursements to farmers with less than 2.5 acres of land were Rs. 10,833 crore 
in 2004–05 while SHG linked loans increased by Rs. 2,994 crore over the same period 
(RBI, 2007, tables 59 and 72).
164 IND IA  POL ICY  FORUM,  2007–08
indebted and had very limited access to bank.7 As part of a process aimed 
at providing banking services to this population, the State Bank of India 
was set up in 1955, the 14 largest commercial banks were nationalized in 
1969, and the NABARD was created in 1982. Each nationalized bank was 
designated a lead bank for a particular state and these banks were required 
to maintain specifi c ratios of urban to rural branches in their state. As a result 
of these policies, a vast network comprising thousands of credit cooper-
atives and regional rural banks was created. There is some evidence that 
this expansion reduced regional poverty (Burgess and Pande, 2005), but it 
was accompanied by operating costs and default rates that were too high to 
be sustainable. Moreover, the reliance on informal credit sources persisted 
among the very poor.
In the early 1990s central bankers tried to revitalize this elaborate and 
largely ineffi cient banking system. The start of institutionalized microfi nance 
in India is often attributed to the circular that was issued by the Reserve Bank 
to all nationalized commercial banks in 1991, announcing the objective of 
linking informal groups of rural poor with these banks. Some NGOs at the 
time had organized women into groups that used their pooled savings for 
mutual insurance and small credit needs. Based on studies of these informal 
groups, it was believed that they had the “potential to bring together the for-
mal banking structure and the rural poor for mutual benefi t” (RBI, 1991). 
The following year NABARD launched a pilot project that linked 500 groups 
with commercial banks. The banks were offered fi nance from NABARD for 
such lending at the rate of 6.5 percent per annum. It was recommended that 
banks either lend directly to groups at 11.5 percent per annum or route their 
loans through voluntary agencies at the lower rate of 8.5 percent in order to 
cover the transaction costs of these agencies (NABARD, 1992). Banks were 
also permitted to classify such lending under Advances to Weaker Sections, 
and this category has historically accounted for a large fraction of their 
unprofi table loans.
Another major change came in April 1999, with the launching of the 
Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana, popularly known as the SGSY 
(RBI, 1999). This program was introduced to increase the membership of 
SHGs among families living below the poverty line. The introduction of the 
SGSY refl ected a signifi cant change in state policy by directly subsidizing 
borrowers (as only part of the initial loan had to be repaid) and by restrict-
ing the composition of a group to families living below the poverty line. 
7. See, for example, Bell (1990) for summary statistics on rural borrowing and indebted-
ness based on rural credit surveys and Karmakar (1999) for recent fi gures on the numbers of 
different types of rural banking institutions.
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Subject to caps, the rates of subsidy were 50 percent for borrowers from the 
SC and ST and 30 percent for other poor households. A proper evaluation of 
the changes that the SGSY brought about in the composition and performance 
of SHGs is yet to be undertaken.8
The NABARD pilot program of 1992 was widely regarded as successful. 
As seen in table 1, the number of SHGs linked to the banking system has been 
rising rapidly over the last 15 years and is currently over 2.5 million. Over 
the past few years, alternative models of lending have appeared and private 
banks have also entered the sector. However, in spite of the rapid growth 
of specialized microfi nance institutions (MFIs) in India, they are estimated 
to cover only about one-half the number of households covered by SHGs.9 
This contrasts sharply with countries such as Bangladesh and Indonesia, 
where each of the major MFI is, in proportional terms, larger than the com-
bined non-SHG sector in India (RBI, 2005); Basu and Srivastava, 2005).
T A B L E  1 .  Cumulated Bank Linkages, 1992–2007
Year (end-March) No. of SHGs linked Bank loans (Rs. crore) 
1992–93 255 0.29 
1993–94 620 0.65 
1994–95 2,122 2 
1995–96 4,757 6 
1996–97 8,598 12 
1997–98 14,317 24 
1998–99 32,995 57 
1999–2000 114,775 193 
2000–01 263,825 480 
2001–02 461,478 1,026 
2002–03 717,360 2,048 
2003–04 1,079,091 3,904 
2004–05 1,618,456 6,898 
2005–06a 2,238,565 11,397 
2006–07 b 2,580,000 14,479 
Sources: Figures from 1992–2005 have been taken from RBI (2006) and RBI (2007).
Note: a. provisional estimates; b. up to end February 2007.
8. Our own surveys indicate that the combination of restrictions of group composition 
and subsidies may have been a factor causing the closure of some groups. Surveyed groups 
were asked about whether or not they received a subsidy. Although very few of the subsidized 
groups failed, other groups sometimes cited their exclusion from state subsidies as a reason for 
the failure of their group. In some cases, a few members were excluded from the group by the 
others because they were not on government poverty lists and the group was required to have 
a certain fraction of their members on these lists in order to be eligible for SGSY subsidies.
9. Ghate (2007, p. 17) estimates that about 14 million households are served by SHGs 
and 7.3 million by MFIs.
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The dominance of SHGs in Indian microfi nance appears to have re-
sulted from the combined presence of a vibrant non-government sector 
engaged in rural development and an extensive but unprofi table network 
of rural banks and agricultural cooperatives that were created with the ex-
plicit purpose of providing small loans to the rural poor10 Policy makers may 
have been impressed by the phenomenal expansion in the outreach of MFIs 
like the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and other countries. The Grameen 
Bank alone, starting from a humble beginning, had reached almost a quarter 
of all Bangladeshi villages by 1991.11 The linking of banks with SHGs was 
a creative approach that harnessed existing investments in rural banking to 
rapidly increase outreach among the poor and gave India its own particular 
brand of microfi nance.
Data
Our data comes from a survey of all of the 1,102 SHGs created by PRADAN 
in two of its fi eld locations, one in northern Orissa and the other in central 
Chhattisgarh. We collected information on the history of every group formed 
since the start of the program in these areas and on each of the 16,800 women 
who, at any stage, had been members of these groups. Our group-level sur-
vey records all loans taken by the group from commercial banks, rules on 
interest rates, fi nes and repayment, and a summary of the production and 
social activities undertaken collectively by group members over the year pre-
ceding the survey. Through member interviews we obtained their social 
and economic characteristics, and their borrowings from internal and bank 
sources. In the few instances in which current or former members of a group 
could not be traced at the time of the survey, we relied on other informed 
respondents. We begin this section with a brief outline of PRADAN’s micro-
fi nance program. This is followed by a description of our survey methodology 
and some descriptive statistics on groups and members.
The PRADAN SHG Program
The fi rst SHG formed by PRADAN was in Alwar, Rajasthan in 1987. In 
subsequent years, the program expanded in several states in central India: 
10. Harper (2002) provides some additional reasons for why SHGs rather than Grameen 
type institutions are more successful in the Indian context.
11. This proportion is based on fi gures for the total number of Bangladeshi villages pub-
lished by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (www.bbs.gov.bd) and the number covered by 
the Grameen Bank (available at www.grameen-info.org).
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Jharkhand, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Chhattisgarh. Table 2 
provides a list of PRADAN locations in each of the six states in which the 
organization operates, together with the year of the fi rst SHG and the total 
number of SHGs in existence at the end of March 2006.12
T A B L E  2 .  Number of PRADAN SHGs in India (As on March 31, 2006)
State Location Yeara First SHG # SHGs 
Chhattisgarh Raigarh 1998 1999 532 
Jharkhand Godda 1987 1989 314 
Jharkhand Barhi 1992 1992 411 
Jharkhand Lohardaga 1992 1995 449 
Jharkhand West Singhbhum 1992 1996 363 
Jharkhand Gumla 1994 1994 484 
Jharkhand Dumka 1995 1989 318 
Jharkhand East Singhbhum 1997 1996 392 
Jharkhand Khunti 2000 1997 314 
Jharkhand Koderma 2000 1992 359 
Jharkhand Petarbar 2000 1998 322 
Jharkhand Deogarh 2002 1989 280 
Rajasthan Dausa 1999 1999 171 
Rajasthan Dholpur 1999 2000 180 
Madhya Pradesh Kesla 1986 1996 300 
Madhya Pradesh Vidisha 2000 2000 44 
Madhya Pradesh Sidhi 2002 2005 49 
Madhya Pradesh Dindori 2005 2005 110 
Orissa Keonjhar 1990 1998 506 
Orissa Balliguda 2001 2001 201 
Rajasthan Alwar 1986 1987 162 
West Bengal Purulia 1987 1995 218 
West Bengal Bankura 2005 2000 142 
Total 6621 
Source: Personal communication with PRADAN.
a. This refers to the year in which a PRADAN office was opened in the area. The Deogarh and Dumka SHGs 
were initially under the Godda office and the Koderma and Peterbar SHGs were managed by the Barhi office. 
This is why the first SHG in these areas predates the opening of the PRADAN branch office.
The groups formed by PRADAN are a small fraction of the total num-
ber of SHGs in the microfi nance sector, but they have an important pre-
sence in the areas in which they operate. The program targets administrative 
blocks with high levels of rural poverty and proceeds by building a dense net-
work of SHGs in these areas over a few years. In recent years, SHGs have 
been the fi rst intervention by the organization in each village and group 
meetings have then been used to introduce other activities aimed at rais-
ing agricultural productivity and rural incomes. The social composition of 
12. The current aggregate fi gures for the SHG program are available at www.pradan.net.
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these villages is often different from other parts of the state and district; the 
proportion of communities classifi ed as ST is higher and literacy rates are 
lower than the state average.
The groups themselves consist entirely of women and are formed 
according to the guidelines issued by NABARD and the Reserve Bank 
(RBI, 1999; NABARD, 1992). Each group has between 10 and 25 mem-
bers and large villages often have multiple groups, one in each hamlet. The 
PRADAN professionals begin the process of group formation by meeting 
village women in a public space in the village. They discuss the benefi ts 
of membership and some general principles followed by successful groups 
(for example, compulsory attendance, weekly savings, sustainable interest 
rates, bookkeeping, and so on). Interested women are enlisted and a regular 
meeting time is set. A professional is usually present at meetings until mem-
bership becomes fairly stable and all members are familiar with group prac-
tices. Each group is provided with a register for keeping accounts and a cash 
box, and the group designates either designates one of the members to keep 
accounts or hires an accountant. The register, cash box, and keys are usually 
rotated among the members.
As groups mature, they get federated and select representatives who 
regularly attend cluster meetings organized by the federation. The groups 
that function smoothly typically open a savings account with a nearby 
commercial bank within a year of their inception. At this stage, PRADAN 
professionals discuss the feasibility of alternative self-employment pro-
jects with the group, and, once a few members decide on particular projects, 
the group applies for loan to a commercial bank. This loan constitutes their 
fi rst bank linkage. Bank funds come into the group and are then are lent to 
individual members. These members make payments to the group, which 
then repays the bank on the stipulated date.
Over time, the professionals who initiated the group withdraw and their 
interactions with members are limited to cluster meetings and occasional 
visits to the village. Regular communication with PRADAN takes place 
mainly through copies of weekly accounting transactions that are sent in 
to the local offi ce. Groups are free to determine the rules under which they 
operate and the stringency with which they are implemented. After the in-
ception of the SGSY in 1999, some subsidies to groups are routed through 
PRADAN, provided the groups satisfy the selection criteria required by the 
scheme. Therefore both subsidized and unsubsidized SHGs co-exist in the 
same area.
In the absence of regular visits to older SHGs, the organizations pro-
moting these groups are not always informed about their functioning. Suc-
cessful groups may stop sending in accounts as they reduce their reliance on 
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PRADAN, others may temporarily suspend meetings because some mem-
bers migrate seasonally, and yet others may stop their activities altogether. 
Survey data is therefore required to accurately track the performance of 
groups over time.
The Survey Design
As mentioned above, we surveyed all PRADAN groups created in the dis-
tricts of Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj in northern Orissa and the district of 
Raigarh in eastern Chhattisgarh. Both the districts in Orissa are serviced 
by the professionals in Keonjhar and we henceforth refer to these groups 
as the Keonjhar SHGs. The three survey districts are shown in fi gure 1 and 
surveyed areas within each district are indicated in fi gures 2–4. Although 
only a small fraction of each district is actually covered by the program, 
groups are geographically clustered in dense pockets. This makes it easier 
for professionals to visit these areas and it also allows groups to benefi t from 
frequent contact with each other.13
In our analysis, we refer to a group as inactive if the group has not held 
any meetings over the three months prior to the survey and if its members 
declare that they have no plans to meet in the future. A group is considered 
as active if it is meeting regularly at the time of the survey. All women who 
left groups while the group was still functioning are called past members 
and the others are referred to as present members. This category therefore 
includes women in inactive groups if they remained with the group until 
its last meeting.14
At the group level we collected data on rules, activities, and the timing 
of some signifi cant events. These events include the inception of the SHG, 
the creation of savings accounts, bank loans, the group’s membership in 
an SHG federation, and, for inactive SHGs, their last meeting. Group rules 
include fi nes (for attendance and late repayment), minimum savings require-
ments, interest rates, and the assignment of group responsibilities. We asked 
group members about their collective activities such as the involvement of its 
members in resolving village and family confl icts, their visits to government 
offi cials, and their administration of state-funded school meal programs in 
primary schools. We also recorded the total number of other SHGs formed 
by PRADAN in the same village.
13. Some of these benefi ts are studied by Nair (2005).
14. Our main reason for using this classifi cation is that we would like to distinguish between 
members who left existing groups and those whose membership ended because the group 
became inactive. It is likely that the factors underlying these two types of events are different. 
We intend to explore these differences more carefully in future research.
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F I G U R E  1 . Study Area
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Legend
State Boundary
STUDY DISTRICTS
Chhattisgarh
Orissa
Uttar Pradesh
Jharkhand
West Bengal
Keonjhar
Raigarh
Mayurbhanj
N
Source: Census of India.
For all present and past members, we collected information on a stand-
ard set of characteristics relating to their social and economic background: 
caste, education, age, marital status, fertility, household landholdings, and 
some parental information. Our data on caste includes both the jati of each 
member and the offi cial caste category to which the jati belongs. We classify 
a group as homogenous if all its members belong to the same jati. For each 
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F I G U R E  2 . Raigarh
District Boundary
Tahsil Boundary
Railway Line
Road
River
Places
Sample Survey Location
PRADAN
Location : Raigarh
Block: Raigarh
PRADAN
Sub-Location : Tamnar
Block: Tamnar
Dharmjaygarh
Khargaon
Tolonga
Tariakela
Gharghoda
Kharsia
RAIGARH
Sarangarh Balamkela
N
Legend
Source: Census of India.
172 IND IA  POL ICY  FORUM,  2007–08
F I G U R E  3 . Keonjhar
Parsora
Palasponga
Keonjhargarh
Dhenkikot
Ghatgaon
Kantalai
Deogaon
District Boundary
Tahsil Boundary
Railway Line
Road
River
Places
Sample Survey Location
Legend
PRADAN
Sub-Location : Keonjhar
Block: Keonjhar
Sadar+Banspal
PRADAN
Sub-Location : Turumunga
Block: Patana
N
Source: Census of India.
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F I G U R E  4 . Mayurbhanj
Bahalda
Kuchaibura
Damribera
Asana
Bodo Raruan Joshipur
Bangriposi
Bovinathpur
BARIPADA
Karanjia
Kendumundi
Thakurmunda
Kaptipada
Chitarda
Betnoti
PRADAN
Location : Karanjia
Block: Karanjia+Thakurmunda
+Sukuruli
Legend
N
District Boundary
Tahsil Boundary
Railway Line
Road
River
Places
Sample Survey Location
Source: Census of India.
member and for each accountant, we recorded their dates of entering and, 
if applicable, leaving the group, and the total value of loans taken by them. 
We also created a relationship matrix, which recorded family ties between 
members. For inactive groups, we asked members the main reason for group 
failure and recorded the most popular response. Similarly, we asked past 
members the main reason for their departure from a group.
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Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides a chronology of the formation of SHGs in our study area. 
The survey in Keonjhar was conducted during the summer of 2006 and the 
Raigarh survey was in January 2007. In each case, we surveyed all groups 
created in the area from the start of the program until the date of our sur-
vey. This gives us a total of 1,102 groups created in the period 1998–2006. 
Of these 10 percent were inactive by the time of the survey (12 percent in 
Raigarh and 9 percent in Keonjhar).
T A B L E  3 .  Year-wise Formation and Dissolution of SHGs Survey Data, 
1998–2006
Started Inactive Bank loan 
Year Keonjhar Raigarh Keonjhar Raigarh Keonjhar Raigarh 
1998 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 10 18 0 0 0 0 
2000 51 61 0 0 0 3 
2001 27 36 3 5 2 7 
2002 155 30 4 5 14 23 
2003 89 46 11 7 100 31 
2004 95 172 9 8 95 100 
2005 85 160 17 24 89 140 
2006 16 47 2 20 62 91 
Totala 532 570 46 69 362 395 
Source: Survey Data, 1998–2006.
Note: a. There are two main reasons why the totals in this table do not match with those in table 2. First, 
we included all groups that were formed before the survey date, and some of these were created after March 
2006. Second, table 2 is based on administrative data that do not always account for group failures since 
these are not consistently reported.
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics on groups by their survival status. 
A comparison of the two types of groups throws up some interesting pat-
terns. First, active and currently inactive groups are both reasonably long-
lived with inactive groups operating for an average of two years after they 
are formed. Second, there are many more homogenous groups in Keonjhar 
in both categories and these groups as a whole have lower survival rates. 
This pattern is driven by groups composed of ST, who form a majority of our 
surveyed population, and it does not hold systematically for the other caste 
categories. Since we have defi ned a homogenous group as one in which all 
women are of the same tribe or caste, the lower survival rates refl ect in part 
lower levels of education among some tribal communities, which make it 
hard to sustain a group. We discuss this issue in detail in Section 5. Third, 
groups that survive are more involved in the village activities and in the lives 
Jean-Marie Baland, Rohini Somanathan and Lore Vandewalle 175
T A B L E  4 .  Group Characteristics by Survival Status
Keonjhar Raigarh 
Active Inactive Active Inactive
Number of groups 486 46 501 69 
Percentage (91) (9) (88) (12) 
Average duration (days) 1105 884 1129 620 
COMPOSITION 
Total number of castes in dataset 88 22 96 45 
Average number of castes 2.4 1.8 4.0 3.4 
Average number of caste categories 
(ST, SC, OBC, FC) 
1.8 1.3 2.3 2.2 
Fractionalization index 0.26 0.17 0.51 0.46 
HOMOGENOUS GROUPS (%) 34.8 52.2 10.2 13.0 
ST (% of homogenous) 68.6 91.6 60.8 66.7 
SC (% of homogenous) 8.9 4.2 19.6 33.3 
OBC (% of homogenous) 22.5 4.2 17.7 0 
FC (% of homogenous) 0 0 1.9 0 
GROUP ACTIVITIES LAST YEAR 
Midday meals (%) 9 0 12 1 
PDS (%) 3 0 4 0 
Panchayat meetings (%) 34 22 56 35 
Exposure trips (%) 70 41 13 6 
Federation meetings (%) 12 2 2 0 
Meeting government officials (%) 20 7 32 16 
Involvement in family or village conflict or 
member in distress (%) 
44 26 52 26 
RULES 
Minimum weekly saving (%) 100 100 94 96 
Saving compulsory (%) 30 20 38 39 
Groups with absence fines (%) 97 67 38 26 
Absence fine (Rs.) 3.1 2.6 3.8 3.2 
Higher interest rates default (%) 15 13 92 91 
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS 
Received a subsidy (%) 14 0 5 1 
Developed a group project (%) 34 9 26 6 
Accountant is a member (% of accts) 68 41 59 62 
MEMBERS 
Average number of members 16 15 15 15 
Past member (%) 13 14 15 14 
Literate (%) 33 12 29 25 
No school (%) 59 87 64 70 
Maximum education (years) 9 5 8 7 
Mean education (years) 2.8 1.0 2.0 1.6 
Mean land (Acres) 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.9 
Source: Survey Data, 1998–2006.
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of their members. They are more likely to administer government schemes, 
meet government offi cials, attend cluster meetings, go on exposure trips or-
ganized by PRADAN to observe projects in other villages, and get involved 
in resolving family and village confl icts. In terms of their demographic char-
acteristics, members of active groups are, on average, more educated, they 
own more land, and more of them act as accountants for their group.15 
Differences in group size are negligible.
Table 5 compares present and past members, homogenous caste groups 
retain a slightly higher proportion of their members. Demographic char-
acteristics of past and present members are similar. Members who eventually 
T A B L E  5 .  Characteristics of Present and Past Members
Keonjhar Raigarh 
Present Past All Present Past All 
Number of women 7473 1116 8589 6995 1216 8211 
(%) (87) (13) (100) (85) (15) (100) 
Average duration (days) 1002 491 936 1071 542 993 
CASTE CATEGORY COMPOSITION 
ST (%) 60.8 62.0 61.0 46.7 52.2 47.5 
SC (%) 10.6 10.9 10.6 19.3 23.0 19.8 
OBC (%) 27.1 25.8 26.9 32.1 23.0 30.8 
FC (%) 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.9 1.8 1.9 
BACKGROUND 
Education (number of years) 2.7 2.5 2.7 1.9 1.6 1.9 
No school (%) 61 65 61 65 68 65 
Read and write (%) 31 29 31 30 24 29 
Father’s education (number of years) 2.2 1.5 2.1 2.1 1.3 2.0 
Land (acres) 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.8 2.0 
RELATION TO GROUP 
Relatives within group (%)a 12.0 7.6 11.4 8.2 5.8 7.8 
In homogenous groups (%) 35.3 32.3 34.9 9.8 7.3 9.4 
Previous SHG membership (%) 4.4 9.0 5.0 5.7 6.5 5.8 
Joined other SHG after leaving (%) 20.4 18.3 
CHAIRMANb
membership < 2 years (%) 5.6 0.49 4.7 8.5 3.2 7.1 
2 years < membership < 4 year (%) 7.7 3.3 7.3 9.1 3.7 8.7 
4 year < membership (%) 8.3 0 8.1 8.7 5.8 8.5 
Source: Survey Data, 1998–2006.
Note: a. Percentage of members who have at least one relative in their group.
b. Percentage of members who have been chairman, given the duration of their membership.
15. The average member characteristics for both types of groups are calculated using all 
members that were ever part of the group.
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T A B L E  6 .  Distribution of SHG Members by Caste 
Keonjhar Raigarh 
ST 5231 3878 
(%) (61) (47) 
SC 916 1616 
(%) (10) (20) 
BC 2397 2512 
(%) (27) (31) 
FC 124 157 
(%) (2) (2) 
SCHEDULED TRIBESa 
Bhuiyans 1127 203 
Kharia 15 466 
Ho 444 5 
Munda 533 12 
Santhals 501 0 
Bathundi 811 0 
Gond 432 620 
Ganda 375 127 
SCHEDULED CASTES 
Harijans 421 11 
Chauhan 0 886 
OTHER BACKWARD CASTES 
Yadav 5 697 
Mahanta 823 99 
Kurmi 493 14 
Teli 95 497 
Source: Survey Data, 1998–2006.
Note: a. Only the largest groups are reported here.
leave have fewer years of education and a smaller fraction of them are literate, 
but these differences are not large. A striking contrast between those who 
remain in SHGs and those who leave is seen in the networks these women 
have within their groups and in the extent to which they are responsible for 
group decisions. In Keonjhar, 12 percent of women currently in groups had 
another relative in the groupwhile this was true of only 7.6 percent of past 
members, and those who stayed in their groups were at least twice as likely 
to have held the position of group chairman, conditional on the number of 
days spent in the group. Table 6 shows the distribution of present and past 
SHG members across the major caste groups in the area. We use these groups 
in our empirical analysis in the next section and investigate whether the 
durability of SHGs varies by community.
A variety of reasons were cited by respondents for group inactivity and 
exit of members from the groups. The principal responses are shown in 
table 7. We asked former members of inactive groups for their assessment 
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T A B L E  7 .  Stated Reasons for Group Failure and Member Exit
Keonjhar Raigarh 
GROUP 
PRADAN withdrew support 18.2 11.8 
Personal conflicts/leadership problems/accountant problems 45.5 38.2 
Unpaid loans/irregular savings 27.3 25.0 
Others 9.0 25.0 
Total 100 100 
Number of observations 46 69 
MEMBER 
PERSONAL REASONS 
Illness/death 8.3 8.1 
Left village/married/seasonal migration/going to school 17.8 12.0 
RELATED TO GROUP 
The family was not supportive 6.2 9.1 
Could not reimburse a loan taken/difficulty in saving 29.2 17.1 
Could not attend the meetings 9.8 12.8 
Personal conflict with the group 15.5 20.3 
Excluded by the group 4.9 1.0 
OTHERS 
Wanted to join another group 0.5 6.5 
Othersa 7.8 13.1 
TOTAL 100 100 
Number of observations 1116 1216 
Source: Survey Data, 1998–2006.
Note: a. Others includes not understanding the working of the SHG,PRADAN official stopped visiting the 
group, the group is too big, and no clear reason.
of why the group stopped functioning. In both regions, problems of leader-
ship and confl ict turned out to be the most important (40 percent) followed 
by low savings and repayment rates. The stated reasons for member de-
partures vary by region. Diffi culties in saving and reimbursement are most 
important in Keonjhar while personal confl icts matter more in Raigarh. 
These responses are not surprising given the higher levels of education of 
departing members in Raigarh and the greater social heterogeneity of their 
groups. Between one quarter and afi fth of all members who have left cite 
personal reasons, which often involve leaving their village.
The borrowing and lending activities of groups are summarized in 
table 8. Almost all active groups provided their members with loans from 
internal funds in the year prior to the survey and a fairly high fraction of 
members received such loans (87 percent in Keonjhar and 63 percent in 
Raigarh). Borrowing members of active groups received an average of 
between two and three loans during the year prior to the survey and they 
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borrowed an average of Rs. 2,298 from the group. For inactive groups, we 
recorded lending activities during the last year of their regular functioning. 
Most of these groups in Keonjhar did lend out internal funds while less than 
one-third of the inactive Raigarh groups were engaged in such lending dur-
ing the last year in which these groups were active. In both cases, access to 
these loans was very uneven and less than 15 percent of members received 
such loans. Those who did borrow received sizable amounts of, on an aver-
age, Rs. 1,831 in Keonjhar and Rs. 1,024 in Raigarh. It is plausible that this 
uneven distribution of group funds may have led to the high levels of group 
confl ict reported by members of inactive groups.
Nearly three-quarters of active groups in both areas have been linked 
with commercial banks. Linked SHGs have received an average of 1.7 bank 
loans and average total borrowings of Rs. 48,518. Over 80 percent of mem-
bers in linked groups received these loans, resulting in average borrowings 
of a little over Rs. 4,000 per member.16 To better understand the extent of 
credit provided by banks per year, we compute the number of days between 
the fi rst group linkage and the survey date for active groups and the days 
from the fi rst linkage to the last meeting for inactive groups. Using the aver-
age duration of 685 days (across all regions and both active and currently 
inactive groups), members receiving bank credit get about Rs. 2,000 per year 
through these linkages.
Empirical Methods
General Issues
In the previous section, we have described various aspects of the compos-
ition and functioning of SHGs and discussed some of the interesting cor-
relations in our data. We have observed, for example, that groups that survive 
are more involved with village activities, they have more stringent attendance 
and savings requirements, and they share loans more equitably. Members 
who remain in groups are more educated than average and have a network 
of family connections within the group. We now proceed to estimate the 
effects of some of these group and member characteristics on the duration 
of group and on the length of time women remain in these groups.
16. This is roughly 100 US dollars at the current exchange rate and $ 273 using the pur-
chasing power parity rate of 14.67 released by the International Comparison Program in 
December 2007.
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The group and member life-spans that we are interested in have to be 
estimated using data that is right censored. In other words, we would like 
to estimate the length of time that groups and members survive using data 
in which most groups are still active and most women who joined these 
groups are still in them. This makes many standard regression techniques 
inappropriate for our purpose. To see why, suppose that we use a binary 
variable, which takes the value of one for groups (or members) that are no 
longer active and zero otherwise, and would like to estimate the effect of a 
set of co-variates on the likelihood of survival. Even if all groups had the 
same chances of survival, and our co-variates did not matter at all, we would 
observe older groups surviving at lower rates simply because they are older, 
and the characteristics of these groups would therefore appear to be nega-
tively associated with the likelihood of survival. We would therefore obtain 
inconsistent estimates of the effects of group and member characteristics 
on survival rates. To take another example, suppose PRADAN started its 
SHG program in areas with low literacy. Even if literacy did not matter for 
group duration, it would appear to matter because older groups are less 
likely to have survived until our survey date and these groups have lower 
literacy rates.
If we try to avoid these types of biases by restricting our sample to in-
active groups and to members who have completed their stay in a group, 
we lose a lot of the variability in our sample and reduce it to a fraction of 
its current size. What we do instead is to use methods of survival analysis, 
popular in the biomedical and quality control fi elds, which allow us to use 
censored observations by making use of information on the censored group 
or member until the time of censoring, rather than simply ignoring these 
observations or not accounting for the fact that they are censored. These 
methods are used to estimate the time until events occur in our case, the events 
being either the cessation of regular group activity for the group-level analy-
sis, or the departure of a member for our study of member attrition.
We estimate the distribution of a random variable T which denotes the 
duration (in days) of a group, or of a member within a group. This dis-
tribution can be represented in several ways.17 The survival function ST(t) 
represents the probability of surviving beyond a time t or, in other words, 
the probability that the random variable T > t or that the event has not 
occurred until time t. The hazard rate hT(t) is, in the language of survival 
analysis, the instantaneous chance of failure at time t. For our purposes, it 
17. This discussion is based on Klein and Moeschberger (2003), chapters 2 and 3.
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is the probability a member will leave a group at time t, conditional on her 
being there until that point in time. Finally, the cumulative hazard rate HT(t) 
is sum or integral of these hazard rates over (0, t), depending on whether T 
is discrete or continuous.
These three representations of the distribution of T can be estimated 
using either parametric or non-parametric methods. Non-parametric estima-
tors are a natural choice when dealing with a homogenous population be-
cause of the fl exibility they offer. Our population is far from homogenous 
but we begin with these nonparametric estimates as descriptive tools to 
summarize the survival behavior of groups and members. We then estimate 
a parametric model that allows us to incorporate co-variates and therefore 
estimate the causal effects of group and member characteristics on survival 
rates. A variety of different non-parametric estimators and parametric models 
are available. For non-parametric estimates we focus on the Nelson–Aalen 
estimator of the cumulative hazard function, which is shown to have desirable 
small sample properties and on a smoothed hazard rate derived from this 
estimator. For parametric estimates we use the Weibull model for reasons 
discussed below.
The Nelson–Aalen Estimator
With right censored data, the exact lifetime is only observed if failure 
or exit occurs before the time of censoring, namely the date at which the 
group was surveyed. In the following discussion, we will usually refer to 
events as the exit of SHG members although the same principle applies for 
group failure.
Suppose that in our data, members exit groups at D distinct times 
ti < t2 < … < tD and that at time ti there are di departures. Time, in our case, 
is the number of days since the member joined the group. Let Yi represent 
the number of individuals who are at risk at time ti. In our case, this is the 
number of members who are still part of the group at ti or who leave it at ti. 
Members who do not leave but are observed for less than ti days in the group 
are subtracted from Yi. The ratio di/Yi estimates the conditional probability 
that a group or a member who survives to time ti, experiences the event at 
time ti. The Nelson–Aalen estimator is then given by:
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By smoothing the jump sizes of this estimator with a parametric kernel, 
we can obtain a hazard function h(t).
The Weibull Model
We now impose some additional structure on the survival function to 
examine the importance of various group and member characteristics on 
survival times. We assume that both group and member duration follow a 
Weibull distribution. The natural log of the cumulative hazard function in the 
Weibull model is linear as a function of the log of member duration. Figure 5 
plots these two variables for our dataset of members (using Nelson–Aalen 
estimates of H(t)). The model seems to fi t the data fairly well except for 
members with very short durations within groups. The group-level plot 
looks similar.
F I G U R E  5 . Appropriateness of the Weibull Model
Given a vector of covariates Z and corresponding coeffi cients β, the 
Weibull hazard rate is given by
 h(x |Z) = (αλxα–1) exp(β′Z)
The fi rst expression (a\xa–1) is referred to as the baseline hazard, ho and 
a is termed the shape parameter. All our results are presented in the form 
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of hazard ratios corresponding to our explanatory variables. For binary 
variables these tell us the factor by which the hazard function moves up or 
down relative to the baseline hazard. In general, it gives us the ratio of the 
hazard function to the baseline hazard for a unit change in the explanatory 
variable. If an explanatory variable has no effect on the risk of failure our 
estimated hazard ratio should be close to 1.
Results
We fi rst present non-parametric estimates of hazard functions separately 
for each of our areas and then discuss the effects of group and member char-
acteristics based on the Weibull model.
Nonparametric Estimates
The Nelson–Aalen estimates of cumulative hazard functions are shown in 
the upper panel of fi gure 6. The lower panel shows hazard rates that are 
obtained by a kernel smoothing of the hazard contributions provided by the 
Nelson–Aalen estimators. Like all estimates obtained by kernel procedures, 
these hazard rates are not reliable at the end points of the time-interval 
because our sample is thin in this region.
The lower survival rates for SHGs in Raigarh shown in table 3 are also 
refl ected here.
The double-humped hazard rate for Raigarh suggests that there are two 
different phases in a group’s life when it is especially vulnerable: about a 
year after inception and then again after three or four years. The hazard 
rates in Keonjhar vary much less over a group’s lifetime. We noted that the 
Raigarh groups are much more socially heterogenous than those in Keonjhar 
and that group confl ict is often cited by members as a reason for leaving the 
group. One reason for the differences in estimated hazard rates across our 
two regions may be the higher levels of confl ict in Raigarh. The fi rst rise in 
hazard rates is at about the time that a group takes its fi rst bank loan and the 
sharing of this loan may be a possible source of confl ict in heterogeneous 
groups. In the absence of any direct evidence on this type of confl ict, this is 
of course purely speculative.
Figure 7 displays hazard rates for members in the two regions. The risk 
of exit in the early stages of membership is very similar, but once again, 
we see a second hump in the Raigarh hazard function that is missing for 
Keonjhar. Differences in these member-level hazard rates across the two 
areas appear less marked than the group-level estimates of fi gure 6.
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As discussed earlier (under sub-section Descriptive Statistics), mem-
bers who had left groups were asked for the principal reason for their de-
parture. The two most frequently cited reasons were (a) diffi culty in saving 
and repayment and (b) confl ict with other group members. fi gures 8 and 9 
estimate hazard rates based on restricted samples of members to illustrate 
the importance of these two factors as a function of the length of time a 
member stays in the group. Figure 8 is based on a sample that includes only 
those members that left due to diffi culty in savings or repayment. Similarly, 
fi gure 9 includes only those that stated confl ict as their reason for leaving 
the group. The reversal of hazard rates across regions in these two fi gures 
is striking. Exit due to diffi culty in saving and repayment is much more 
important in Keonjhar and reverses the relative position of the aggregate 
hazard functions seen in fi gure 7. As our summary statistics suggest in table 7, 
confl ict is more important in Raigarh.
F I G U R E  6 . Nelson–Aalen Estimates of Regional Hazard Rates: SHG Level
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F I G U R E  7 . Member Level Regional Hazard Rates
Parametric Estimates
Weibull estimates using group-level data are presented in table 9. Of the 
various characteristics that we consider, the only ones that systematically 
affect group hazard rates are the number of other PRADAN-initiated SHGs 
in the village and the maximum level of education within the group. Both 
these lower the risk of group failure. In our most comprehensive specifi ca-
tion, an additional year of education for the most educated member of the 
group lowers the hazard rate by 8 percent and an additional group in the 
same village lowers it by 18 percent. It is conceivable that the presence of 
an educated member facilitates interactions with banks and other offi cials, 
and ensures better book-keeping. Other groups in the village may help 
either through the sharing of information or by making it more likely that 
a PRADAN professional frequently visits the area. We have not looked at 
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F I G U R E  8 . Hazard Due to Difficulty in Saving: Member-Level Data
F I G U R E  9 . Hazard Due to Member Conflict: Member Level Data
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these mechanisms directly and at this stage these are simply conjectures that 
are consistent with our data and have some anecdotal support.
Before proceeding to study the exit of members from functioning groups, 
it is worth noting that many of the factors that are commonly believed to 
affect collective action processes do not seem to matter for the group sur-
vival in our model. Group size, average landholdings, social networks or 
our various measures of social heterogeneity—none of these has statistically 
signifi cant effects on group survival. In particular, the lower survival rates 
observed for tribal communities seem to result from their demographic 
characteristics rather than their tribal status per se. Survival is admittedly a 
crude signal of group success and it may be that these group characteristics 
do matter for the fi nancial success of groups. We are currently in the process 
of collecting fi nancial data on the SHGs in our sample and plan to explore 
these questions in future work.
Table 10 is based on our member-level dataset and identifi es the deter-
minants of member attrition from groups while these groups are still func-
tioning. Member exit appears to be sensitive to both member characteristics 
and group composition. Women from the intermediate social category of 
OBCs have lower hazard rates than those from other castes. Education, chil-
dren, and relatives within the group are also associated with longer life-spans. 
Separated women are less likely to leave their group, perhaps because they 
T A B L E  9 .  Hazard Rates for SHGs, Weibull Model
(1) (2) (3) 
Shape parameter 1.12  1.13 1.16
Homogenous SHG, caste 1.11 (0.37) 
Homogenous SHG, ST 1.20 (0.41) 1.18 (0.41) 
Homogenous SHG, SC 1.76 (1.02) 1.73 (1.02) 
Homogenous SHG, OBC 0.25 (0.26) 0.26 (0.27) 
Fractionalization 0.78 (0.44) 0.79 (0.44) 0.74 (0.42) 
Average relations in group 0.84 (0.55) 0.79 (0.51) 0.80 (0.52)
Number of initial members 0.95 (0.03) 0.95* (0.03) 0.95 (0.03) 
Maximum education in group 0.92** (0.02) 0.92** (0.02) 0.92** (0.03) 
Average land (Acres) 0.97 (0.06) 
Average age 0.95** (0.02) 
Average total children 1.12 (0.21) 
Average separated 3.9 (3.52) 
Concurrent PRADAN SHGs 0.82** (0.03) 0.82** (0.03) 0.82** (0.03) 
Raigarh 1.63** (0.38) 1.57* (0.36) 1.72** (0.44) 
Number of observations 1064 1064 1062
Number of departures 107 107 106 
Note: *significant at a 10 percent significance level. **significant at a 5 percent significance level.
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have greater need for the social network provided by it. The average age 
of members in a group and higher average landholdings are also positively 
associated with the survival of its members.
The role played by family connections within the group seems to be 
particularly important. Using the combined sample of all members and con-
trolling for a large set of member and group characteristics (the last column 
in table 10), we fi nd that the hazard rate for a woman with one relative in 
the group is 92 percent below the hazard rate for a woman with no relatives. 
On the other hand, we fi nd that the average density of family networks in 
the group puts members at greater risk. This suggests that the most vulner-
able members are those with no relatives in groups where the other mem-
bers are closely related. Finally, the existence of competing PRADAN SHGs 
within the same village also encourages attrition, most likely by mem-
bers who choose to participate in another group. This effect of competition 
is statistically signifi cant but not large.
There is a sizable literature on the role of social heterogeneity and con-
fl ict in group settings.18 Almost a fi fth of the members in our survey who 
have left groups report personal confl icts as their main reason for leaving. 
We explore the role of heterogeneity in a variety of different ways. Our fi rst 
approach is to construct a number of measures of social heterogeneity and 
use these as explanatory variables. We use our data on the jatis of individual 
members to construct a social fractionalization index that is commonly 
used in the literature. The value of the index is based on the shares of each 
caste or jati in the group and is obtained by subtracting the sum of squares 
of these shares from one. This variable therefore takes on strictly positive 
values whenever members of a group are of different castes even if they 
are all in the same offi cial caste category. We also include a set of dummy 
variables for groups where all members have the same caste and for those 
where they are of different castes but of the same caste category. We fi nd 
that group fractionalization raises hazard rates. When we estimate the model 
separately for each of our four offi cial caste categories, we fi nd this effect 
of fractionalization especially marked for the ST and the SC (columns 3 
and 4, respectively, in table 10). To illustrate, if we estimate our duration 
model using only the SC women in our sample, we fi nd that a change in the 
fractionalization index from zero to one (the minimum and maximum values 
this index can take) causes the hazard function to jump up by 74 percent. 
This is double the value of the corresponding coeffi cient in our full sample 
of women.
18. See Banerjee et al. (2008) for a survey.
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Our second approach is to estimate the model only for those SHGs that 
have women from at most two offi cial caste categories. This means, for 
example, that we exclude groups with a combination of SC, ST, OBC, and 
FC women, but include groups that are constituted from any two of these 
categories. Our intention here is to examine whether the chances of exit 
vary based on whether a member forms part of a majority or a minority (in 
terms of these offi cial categories) within the SHG. These results are shown 
in table 7. Group heterogeneity affects ST women the most. SC women leave 
heterogenous and homogenous groups at similar rates and those from the 
OBCs are more likely to leave heterogenous groups only when they are in a 
minority. Somewhat surprisingly, the extent to which greater heterogeneity 
is associated with exit does not depend on whether the SHG is comprised 
entirely of tribal women or of a mixture of castes and tribes. These results 
point to a lack of solidarity among the ST and are consistent with other re-
search that demonstrates that, unlike the SC, tribal communities have not 
succeeded in establishing a common identity.19
Caste, Education, and Family Networks
Our parametric estimates show that the attrition of women from SHG groups 
is selective along three major dimensions: caste, education, and the number 
of relatives in the group. We now examine the role of these characteristics 
more carefully.
19. Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) fi nd that the ST received far fewer government-
fi nanced public goods than the SC over the period 1971–91.
T A B L E  1 1 .  Hazard Rates for Members by Caste Categories: Weibull Model 
(Restricted Sample)
ST SC OBC FC 
Shape parameter 0.78 0.78 0.77 1.09 
Heterogenous within the same 
caste category
1.44** (0.16) 0.66 (0.24) 1.2 (0.33)
Heterogenous across caste 
categories and member of 
the majority caste category 
1.31** 
 
(0.11) 1.04 
 
(0.20) 1.03 
 
(0.17) 0.84 
 
(2.66)
Heterogenous  across caste 
categories and member of 
the minority caste category
1.23 
 
(0.21) 1.19 
 
(0.27) 1.68** (0.31) 1.35 (5.24)
Concurrent pradan SHGs 1.03** (0.01) 1.01 (0.02) 1.06** (0.02) 0.77 (0.32)
Number of observations 6706 1321 2962 87 
Number of departures 848 182 301 7 
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Table 12 contains survival rates for women in each of the four caste cat-
egories, separately for each region and for homogenous and heterogenous 
groups. Average attrition is greatest among the ST. Over the fi rst two years 
of membership, survival rates for homogenous groups are higher than those 
for heterogenous groups and higher for Keonjhar than for Raigarh, but at 
the end of three years about a quarter of the ST women have left their group 
and this rate does not vary much across region or across homogenous and 
heterogenous groups. Scheduled Castes remain longer in their groups in 
Keonjhar, but not in Raigarh and castes that comprise the OBCs survive 
longer in both areas.
T A B L E  1 2 .  Member Survival by Caste
Keonjhar Raigarh
Homogenous Heterogenous Homogenous Heterogenous
ST 
Number of members 1945 2535 453 3064 
 1 year 92.4 91.2 90.8 87.8 
 2 year 82.5 82.6 84.5 80.2 
 3 year 75.3 76.3 75.0 74.4 
SC 
Number of members 210 530 163 1248 
 1 year 97.0 90.3 85.3 87.7 
 2 year 93.8 85.4 70.1 79.1 
 3 year 89.4 81.3 67.2 76.8 
OBC 
Number of members 495 1429 99 2210 
 1 year 93.3 92.8 100.0 89.1 
 2 year 90.5 88.2 98.7 82.7 
 3 year 84.0 83.9 98.7 79.4 
Source: Survey Data, 1998–2006.
Table 13 presents results from a similar exercise, stratifying this time 
member survival by education levels. In Keonjhar there is a marked differ-
ence in survival rates for uneducated women relative to those with some 
education. Over a quarter of those with no education left their groups within 
three years of joining them while only 10 percent of those with some pri-
mary schooling did so. An interesting pattern seen in the table is the non-
monotonicity of survival rates by education levels. In Keonjhar, women with 
between one and fi ve years of schooling stay longer in groups than those 
with some secondary schooling. Patterns in Raigarh are similar, though 
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less marked. One plausible hypothesis is that uneducated members leave 
because they are discriminated against or because they fi nd it diffi cult to meet 
the savings requirements of the group while the more educated ones leave 
because they have better prospects. This is worrying given our fi nding that 
group survival depends on the highest education level in the group.
Table 14 is based on a member’s education relative to others in the 
group. For each group we compute quantiles corresponding to the educa-
tion levels of the bottom quarter, half and three-quarters of the population. 
In Keonjhar, we observe the highest attrition among those below the fi rst 
quantile and the lowest attrition is found in the group between the fi rst and 
second quantiles. These differences in survival rates are not however large 
relative to those seen in table 13. No systematic pattern is seen in Raigarh.
Table 15 compares survival rates across members based on their family 
networks within the group. Members are classifi ed into two groups; those 
with no family relationships within the group and those with at least one 
relative in the group. The last column in table 15 shows that the differences 
across these types are large: in Keonjhar, members with no relatives have a 
T A B L E  1 3 .  Member Survival by Education
Keonjhar Raigarh 
No education 
Number of members 4512 4877 
 1 year 91.6 88.4 
 2 year 82.2 80.5 
 3 year 74.9 75.7 
class 1–5 
Number of members 1049 1694 
 1 year 95.1 88.8 
 2 year 92.2 82.3 
 3 year 90.2 78.2 
class 6–8 
Number of members 457 593 
 1 year 91.1 88.0 
 2 year 87.3 81.2 
 3 year 84.3 77.3 
class 9–12 
Number of members 1230 243 
 1 year 91.3 87.7 
 2 year 87.3 82.8 
 3 year 82.6 77.5 
Source: Survey Data, 1998–2006.
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survival rate of 74.8 percent while those with at least one relative have a sur-
vival rate of 83.1 percent. A similar difference can be observed for Raigarh 
(71.2 percent versus 81.7 percent). This differential attrition starts early and 
over the entire three-year period, the survival function for members with 
relatives lies above the one for members with no relatives in the group.
To get a better idea of how these family networks might operate, we further 
distinguish between the attrition caused by groups becoming inactive and 
the attrition that results from members leaving functioning groups. These 
fi gures are shown in the fi rst two columns of table 15. Recall, that present 
members are defi ned as all those in active groups and those who remained 
in groups that are currently inactive and until the last group meeting. In 
Keonjhar, the differential attrition of connected and un-connected members 
T A B L E  1 4 .  Member Survival by Relative Education
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4 
Keonjhar 
Number of members 3902 491 1033 884 
 1 year 93.4 93.5 93.3 93.2 
 2 year 88.6 90.3 91.0 89.5 
 3 year 85.0 89.2 88.5 86.9 
Raigarh 
Number of members 4513 371 933 1084 
 1 year 92.2 93.8 93.2 93.6 
 2 year 87.7 88.4 90.0 89.2 
 3 year 84.6 86.3 87.4 86.6 
Source: Survey Data, 1998–2006.
T A B L E  1 5 . Member Survival by Family Networks
Present members In active groups All members 
No relatives Relatives No relatives Relatives No relatives Relatives 
Keonjhar 
Number of members 3661 3545 
 1 year 91.8 95.5 98.3 98.5 90.2 94.0 
 2 year 86.4 92.5 94.1 95.8 81.2 88.5 
 3 year 82.2 89.9 90.9 92.4 74.8 83.1 
Raigarh 
Number of members 3697 3723 
 1 year 90.7 94.0 95.3 96.2 86.5 90.3 
 2 year 85.5 90.5 90.2 93.8 77.0 84.9 
 3 year 81.8 88.3 87.0 92.6 71.2 81.7 
Source: Survey Data, 1998–2006.
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arises mainly from women with no relatives leaving functioning groups at 
higher rates. In Keonjhar, 8.2 percent of women with no relatives in the group 
had left it by the end of the fi rst year while the corresponding fi gure for 
women with relatives is only 4.5 percent. At the end of three years, these 
rates are 17.8 percent and 11.1 percent, respectively. In contrast, the rates of 
survival in active groups are not very different for those with and without 
relatives. Three years after joining a group, 90.9 percent of those without 
relatives and 92.4 percent of those with relatives are still in active groups. 
In Raigarh, departures from functioning groups and group closures seem 
equally important causes of attrition from the SHG network. These descrip-
tive tables are consistent with the Weibull hazard ratios presented earlier. 
Social status, family networks and, to a lesser extent, education, are import-
ant predictors of the duration of membership of women in a microfi nance 
network of the type we consider.
Policy Implications
In spite of the phenomenal expansion of the Indian microfi nance sector 
since the early 1990s, and the dominant role played by self-help groups in 
the sector, little is known about the composition and the internal activities 
of these groups or length of time for which they function effectively. This 
paper has attempted to fi ll this gap. We use survey data from SHGs formed 
over the period 1998–2006 in selected regions of northern Orissa and 
Chhattisgarh and estimate the life-spans of groups and members. We fi nd 
that about one-fi fth of those joining an SHG network at some point during 
our reference period have left it by the end of the period. This attrition is 
caused both by groups becoming inactive and by members leaving func-
tioning groups.
We estimate duration models for groups and members separately and 
fi nd that the maximum level of education in a group and the presence of a 
network of other groups in the village are both associated with longer lived 
groups. The life-span of a member within a group depends on her education, 
caste, family structure and, critically, on whether she has other family mem-
bers in the group. Women with more education, intermediate (rather than 
low) caste status, and relatives within a group stay longer.
The aggregate attrition rates we observe are not, in themselves, large 
enough to undermine the effectiveness of the SHG program. In fact some 
attrition is probably desirable if members use the group as an introduction 
to the formal banking system and proceed to enter into individual lending 
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contracts with banks after they leave a group. Groups, with their regular 
meetings, rules and collective action problems are a costly way of linking 
rural women to the banking system and their most useful function may be 
as intermediary institutions which help borrowers make a transition from 
local moneylenders to banks. On the other hand, it is also possible that those 
who leave groups are excluded from them for various reasons and that their 
sources of credit outside these groups are very limited. Our results on the 
determinants of group and member duration support this latter hypothesis: 
groups with educated members and those in villages with other SHGs are less 
likely to fail and it is therefore the remote, disadvantaged communities that 
are most likely to be deprived of credit through these institutions. It appears 
unlikely that women leaving groups are moving on to better opportunities 
and this should make attrition a matter of concern to policy makers.
Before concluding, we would like to draw the reader’s attention to sev-
eral sample selection issues that make it diffi cult to interpret the survival 
rates we observe in our data as representative of the SHG system in India. 
First, the villages selected by PRADAN for their program are not typical of 
most Indian villages and PRADAN as an organization is regarded as being 
especially effective. The villages we surveyed have large ST populations 
and high rates of poverty and illiteracy. The attrition rates we observe may 
therefore be much higher than those for other parts of the country if, as our 
estimates suggest, these variables lead to shorter group and member life-
spans. On the other hand, other parts of the country, most notably south India, 
have multiple organizations promoting SHGs in the same village or town 
and this denser network may lead to more competition and more attrition 
as members move to groups that best match their needs. Organizational 
effectiveness is also likely to be an important determinant of SHG success 
but this has been little explored because of the absence of comparable data 
from different SHG promoting institutions.
Another important issue relates to the non-random selection of SHG 
members within villages.
The survey data on which this paper is based is restricted to members 
of SHGs and it may be that members who choose to participate in these 
groups differ from other families in same village who decide not to par-
ticipate. We cannot rule out biases from this type of selection but we do not 
believe these are large, both because the process by which PRADAN forms 
groups is quite inclusive (all adult women in the hamlet are initially invited 
to join the group) and because existing work that compares SHG members 
and non-members in PRADAN villages elsewhere fi nds that they differ 
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very little at the time that they enter the program.20 We are in the process of 
collecting village-level demographic data and information on the credit and 
background characteristics of a random sample of non-members. We are also 
compiling weekly fi nancial data for the groups in our sample. These data sets 
will facilitate a more careful comparison of members and non-members and 
will also allow us to look beyond survival to other measures of the fi nancial 
success of groups and members.
20. Dewan and Somanathan (2007) study poverty targeting in the SHG program and fi nd 
that while the program neglects the bottom tail of the income distribution, for the most part, 
participants to newly formed SHGs in Jharkhand differ very little from non-participants.
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Comments and Discussion
Kenneth Kletzer: Baland, Somanathan, and Vandewalle present their 
fi rst results from a survey of participants in SHGs set up in two adjoining 
districts in Orissa and one in Chhattisgarh by the NGO PRADAN from 
1998 to 2006. This is a large survey involving approximately 1100 SHGs 
and 16,000 participating women that initiates a very interesting research 
agenda. The focus of this paper is on the dissolution of groups and member 
exit. The duration analysis identifi es a few signifi cant covariates for group 
longevity and member attachment and reveals some interesting patterns in 
the hazard rates. The surveyed SHGs were established in districts where a 
large share of the population belongs to the ST or the SC, and the authors 
emphasize the effects of caste composition of the SHGs on group attrition 
and member departures.
Group Dissolution
The fi rst analysis is the nonparametric estimation of the hazard rates for 
group dissolution and participant exit. Differences between SHGs in the 
two study areas, Keonjhar and Raigarh, are evident in the variation of the 
hazard rates for group dissolution over the life of a group. The hazard rate for 
Raigarh is uniformly higher that for Keonjhar and is double peaked with the 
fi rst peak occurring about one year from group formation. The hazard rate 
for Keonjhar rises over the lifetime of the group so that its peak is associated 
with groups formed at the beginning of the program.
One question raised by this observation applies to the parametric analy-
sis as well. The sample period is the entire period of the program in these 
districts. There may be unobserved differences between SHGs started at the 
outset of the program and those that are formed later. The organization of 
later groups could be informed by experience from the earliest SHGs in these 
districts. Even though the time period is relatively short, the parameters in 
the hazard model estimation may be time varying because the program is 
expanding throughout the period.
The two local maxima for the hazard rates for survival of groups started 
in Raigarh suggest the possibility that some groups lack the characteristics 
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for success from the outset. As shown in table 7, groups that fail in Raigarh 
are much less likely to have made non-linked loans to members than groups 
that fail in Keonjhar (32 percent against 91 percent). In the data summar-
ized, we cannot fi nd out whether groups that fail quickly do so because the 
local population of interested participants lacks the ties, heterogeneity, and 
resources to realize mutual gains from collective saving and borrowing or 
the organization of these groups could be improved. For example, the groups 
dissolving early simply may not meet the threshold to obtain a linked loan 
or too many founding members are unable to meet savings requirements. 
Alternatively, these may be groups that require more guidance or are more 
susceptible to member confl ict or discrimination against members. Why this 
is more pronounced in Raigarh might be a matter for policy even though it 
is probably not possible to explore it in a parametric estimation.
Group formation is a multi-lateral matching problem. PRADAN is set-
ting up clubs and survival and participation depend on what the individuals 
bring to the group and can get out of the group. I think that it important to 
note that few groups fail quickly. The potential gains for members could be 
substantial even though the amounts borrowed seem so small. Even though 
the stated reasons for group failure indicate the importance of personal 
confl icts and leadership problems, it takes time for these to lead to group dis-
solution. Among the signifi cant correlates of group survival in the parametric 
estimation of the hazard rate is the maximum education level of the group 
indicating the importance of basic skills. Another fi nding is that group frac-
tionalization by caste is not associated with group failure although it raises the 
likelihood that a member leaves. The policy implication is that is important 
that some member can keep accounts.
It is hard to gain a clear picture of why groups fail without understand-
ing the gains for the group. Most of the groups that failed did not obtain a 
linked loan (those that did, received a single loan), but three-quarters of the 
groups existing at the survey date received a linked loan and about two-thirds 
of those received a second linked loan (table 7). Similarly, unpaid loans and 
irregular savings are associated with group dissolution. Clearly, whether a 
group received a linked loan or dissolved are related outcomes of how well a 
group functions. However, the data for Keonjhar seems to show that groups 
that do not make it to a linked loan are able to make non-linked loans. What 
determines the receipt of a linked loan may be what determines the survival 
of the group. It could be that groups are failing to meet a threshold, so that it 
would be useful to understand why in the context of studying group survival. 
A clearer picture of group success or failure might be gained by studying 
the criteria for and determinants of receiving linked loans.
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Individual Attrition
Turning to individual member attrition, the nonparametric estimates dis-
play an intuitive pattern. The hazard rate is largest in the fi rst year of partici-
pation and generally declines thereafter. For example, fi gure 8 is consistent 
with the simple idea that some members cannot make the required savings 
from the outset and are unable to participate in a group savings program. The 
hazard rate for departure due to personal confl ict displays a similar peak in the 
fi rst year as the value of the match with the rest of the group is learned.
The estimation of the Weibull model considers how the net gains from 
belonging to the groups depend on individual characteristics. As emphasized 
by the authors, women who are separated, have children, and have relatives 
in the group are signifi cantly less likely to leave the group. They are likely 
to have greater gains from attachment to the group and fewer confl icts in the 
family over fi nancial participation in a SHG. Individual educational attain-
ment and caste are also signifi cant correlates with attachment to the group. 
The authors also note that concurrent local SHG are correlated with exit and 
about 20 percent of women who leave a SHG join another group.
A substantially lower percentage of members who departed groups re-
ceived group loans or part of a linked loan than members who remained 
attached to a group (table 7). Only 14 percent of women who left groups in 
Keonjhar received group loans while 9 percent of those who left groups in 
Raigarh did. It could well be that a primary reason women leave groups is 
their inability to borrow from the group. The decision of the group not to 
lend to a particular member and her decision to leave the group are very 
likely related. The factors that determine whether a member receives a loan 
could be the same as the determinants of member exit. The proximate cause 
for leaving a group could be that the individual fails to receive loans she 
expected when she joined the group and observes other members receiving 
it. I expect that personal confl ict, inadequate savings, or poor opportunities 
for using funds to be among the primary reasons for not receiving a loan. 
These are probably negatively correlated with education and family ties in 
the group. The same reasoning applies to the most frequent reason given 
for leaving a group, inability to reimburse a loan or diffi culty in saving. The 
capacity to repay or save should also be correlated with education, marital 
status, and number of children.
My point is that member attachment is related to the outcomes for the 
individual woman when she is in the group. Characteristics of the indi-
vidual or the match with the group (observed and unobserved) that make it 
less likely she will receive a loan or be able to save will also increase the 
likelihood that she leaves the group. In my opinion, the determinants of loan 
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receipt and saving by the individual in a SHG should be discussed together 
with the determinants of individual attachment to the group. I appreciate 
the authors’ need to focus separate papers on different aspects of a survey 
collected at great effort and the reasonableness of addressing one question at 
a time. Even though causal links may be elusive, these outcomes are closely 
related so that reporting the analysis of member attrition only gives less in-
formation about member attachment and attrition than the survey appears 
to have to offer.
This suggestion applies to the analysis of group survival as well. It would 
be useful to know how important the inability to obtain a linked loan is for 
group dissolution and how group characteristics infl uence the capacity of 
the group to reach the threshold for receiving a linked loan. Thus, an alter-
native would be to study group dissolution with other group outcomes and 
member attachment along with the outcomes that indicate gains for indi-
vidual women from being in the group.
In summary, this is a very interesting paper that investigates self-enforcing 
economic relationships in a highly disadvantaged population. The survey is 
impressive, and the econometric analysis allows a clear picture of the role 
of relationships, education, and caste for realizing gains from cooperation 
in saving and borrowing within the group and from the formal sector. I look 
forward to seeing the analysis of other outcomes from the survey data.
Esther Dufl o: The world of microfi nance in India is deeply divided. On 
one side, the microfi nance institutions (MFIs), adhering to a “grameen style” 
model; on the other, self-help group (SHG), adhering to an “Indian style 
of microfi nance.” The division has deepened with the passions, growing 
more rancorous, far from a reasonable policy debate on the relative merits 
of two models of providing much needed fi nancial services to poor women 
in rural areas.
Barred from collecting savings deposits by the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) regulations, the MFIs focus entirely on lending. Clients start with a 
loan of a few thousand rupees, to be repaid in weekly installments. Often 
they are supported by commercial banks, and they aim to achieve some com-
mercial sustainability. They seek it through a combination of aggressive 
marketing, insistence on repayment discipline, and strong incentives for loan 
offi cers, both to fi nd new clients and to ensure that the existing clients repay. 
Loan offi cers meet with each client group every week to collect repayments. 
This makes the servicing of MFI loans labor intensive and costly. Combined, 
these factors make for fairly high interest rates on MFI loans, presently 
between 12 percent and 25 percent.
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The SHG rely on NGOs that organize groups of women, who start by 
saving together and are eventually linked to a bank. The bank then provides 
them with a savings account or a loan or both. After the initial handholding 
period, lasting up to a year or longer, the groups are left essentially alone. 
The group-formation costs are subsidized, by the World Bank, large NGOs 
such as Care and Oxfam, and by the government itself, to name a few. When 
a SHG is linked, one of the women is made responsible for collecting and 
forwarding the group’s repayments to the bank. So, unlike the MFI, the link-
ing banks do not bear the high labor costs of managing small loans. Combined 
with the implicit subsidy linking banks receive for lending—a benefi t the 
MFI also receive—this makes for lower costs and lower interest rates on 
SHG loans.
This much is known. But with neither the MFI nor the SHG particularly 
transparent about their operating practices, little else is. It was perhaps 
because there was not much independent information to adjudicate the 
claims of either side that the debate began to deteriorate, both sides trad-
ing accusations. Proponents of the SHG model, among them the RBI, have 
argued that MFI rules are not transparent, their lending strategies are too 
aggressive, they do not conduct enough background checks (indeed the 
MFI got into major trouble last year when the RBI started enforcing the 
“know your customer” rules), and many of MFI borrowers end up being 
over-indebted. For their part, proponents of the MFI model have pointed 
out that the SHGs in fact lend very little, and so they cannot really be con-
sidered a substitute for providing improved access to fi nancial services to 
poor women in rural areas. In early 2006, this back and forth issued in what 
is now called the “Andra Pradesh crisis.” At the behest of local politicians 
adhering to SHG model, the local media accused MFI of hounding over-
indebted clients to suicide. MFI accused the government of outright corrup-
tion. The police raided the offi ces of two MFI. The fray went national, then 
international. Many broadsides were written. But, apart from an excellent 
report by Prabu Ghate (cited in the reference list of this paper), there was 
very little dispassionate analysis of the claims on either side.
Given the importance of microfi nance, the passions are not surprising. 
What is surprising is that both sides have gone on with so very little infor-
mation. Efforts to document what is really going on either side would be 
invaluable. The Center for Microfi nance, at IFMR, is spearheading an effort 
to study the MFI. And already valuable evidence on interest rates, competi-
tion practices, and the level of information of their customers has emerged 
from their work. But until now there was almost no complimentary work 
on the SHG. As one of the fi rst studies on SHG, this paper is particularly 
welcome.
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The paper exploits a unique dataset: the authors have conducted a sur-
vey of over 1,000 SHGs started by the NGO PRADAN in two districts in 
Orissa. About 10 percent of these groups are now defunct, and some of the 
members of the existing groups have left. The authors are primarily inter-
ested in what explains which groups survive and which members stay, but 
their data reveal many other interesting things about these SHGs.
Of particular interest is the data on bank linkages. This data sheds some 
light on whether SHG are in fact primarily lending groups. On this, my 
interpretation of the data presented in table 8 differs slightly from that of 
the authors. Viewed from the perspective of a woman considering whether 
or not to join an SHG, we should calculate the average loan received by a 
bank as the product of three quantities—the probability that the group is 
ever linked, the proportion of client from these groups who get a share of 
these loans, and the amount received in total for the groups linked group. 
Using the data in table 8, this calculation comes to Rs. 2,318 (68 percent* 
83 percent* 4108). This is over the entire lifetime of a group, which, accord-
ing to the data in table 4, is 1076 days, or almost exactly 3 years.1 That is, 
Rs. 786 a year on average. Alternatively, since the average group has existed 
for 685 days after the linkage, we could also say that a client joining an SHG 
knows that she will get no loan for a year, and after that a loan of e Rs. 1,000 
a year on an average is expected.
This may not be negligible, but is indeed much lower than what the 
MFI lend. MFI loans in rural areas are usually around Rs. 6,000 in the 
beginning, and the amount increases after the fi rst loan. Strikingly, it is also 
much lower than the fi gure of Rs. 4,000 per member per year reported by 
Sadhan for lending by the SHG (Sadhan is the association of microfi nance 
organizations). One possibility is that Orissa is special. The other is that 
Sadhan reports a number akin to the number reported by the authors in the 
fi fth row of table 8, which is the amount lent per member per linkage, for 
borrowing members and for the duration of the linkage. A major virtue of 
the paper is that is shows very clearly that this is not the only relevant piece 
of information. In this data, almost half (44 percent) of the SHG members 
never borrow. This is important for calculating the implicit subsidies that 
go to the SHG sector. When we compute the cost of creating and maintaining 
a group, it needs to be compared with the amount of money that is actually 
1. Note that both the numerators and the denominators of this expression are censored: 
some groups are still alive, and those groups may get more loans in the future. The ratio would 
still be right under the assumption that the groups that are still alive have reached some sort 
of steady state, in which they borrow at regular intervals. The fact that they do not borrow for 
an entire year when they fi rst start suggest that the second calculation (the amount borrowed 
per year in expectation after the initial screening year) is more robust.
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lent, including the fact that lending takes time to start, and that many people 
will end up never borrowing.
Given these numbers, if we take seriously the point made by the authors 
that microfi nance is the primary reason why these SHGs exist, another 
striking fact of the paper is how many of the groups survive and for how 
long. The hazard rate estimated in the paper suggests that only 25 percent 
of the clients will have left after eight years. This seems to be incredibly 
low. The attrition rates of microfi nance organizations are not well known, 
but in one of the dataset I had access to, the retention rate was considered 
particularly high, with 95 percent of clients renewing their fi rst loan. Even 
if the attrition rate stayed that low in subsequent loans, it would imply that 
there would be 63 percent of the original clients remaining, if all the centers 
of this MFI stayed alive. The SGHs seem to manage at much higher rates 
of persistence despite, at fi rst glance, doing much less.
The puzzle we are left with is, then, what explains these high retention 
rates among SHG. There are several possibilities. First, may be even an 
average of Rs. 1,000 a year from a bank is suffi cient to justify continued 
membership. The authors mention that “membership” is defi ned as regular 
attendance to the group meeting but does not specify regularity. One cost 
of continuing participation in MFI is that clients must attend weekly meet-
ings and must also borrow shortly after their fi rst loan is entirely reimbursed. 
It is possible that SHGs meet less often and give more fl exibility when a 
member wants to borrow, making it worthwhile for the member to stick 
around until the need arises. One possible sign that the possibility of bor-
rowing does matter is that the defunct groups are much less likely to have 
ever been linked than those that still exist (15 percent versus 74 percent in 
one district, and 23 percent versus 74 percent in the other). This is not only 
a mechanical effect of time (they did not have the time to be linked), since 
the average duration of the defunct groups is still well over a year. It may of 
course be that dysfunctional groups are not linked and do not survive. But 
there is at least some indication here that members may not stick around 
in groups that are not linked to banks.
Second, SHG members also lend to each other. The authors calculate 
that they had lent on average Rs. 2,220 to each member in the last year. 
Given that 83 percent of the members had borrowed, and these loans come 
from the own funds of the groups, these must be short duration loans, or the 
groups must be saving large amounts. SHGs thus appear to work like rotat-
ing savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) or like an insurance pool. 
This role appears to be quantitatively more important than the bank linkage. 
It would be fascinating to know a bit more how this is working.
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Third, and related, SHG may be valued by their clients because they offer 
a safe savings opportunity, even for small amounts. In his other works Baland 
has shown that ROSCAs may be used by women to protect their savings 
against their husbands. It may be the case here, too, or more generally, that 
the SHG may provide a way to save safely in environments where such op-
portunities are very rare. Moreover, the rules imposed by the groups may help 
women commit themselves or their family to a regular savings plan. Ashraf, 
Karlan, and Yin have shown that such commitment plans do help people 
save more, and that many people are willing to make such commitment as 
a way to help themselves reach their goals. MFIs provide a similar commit-
ment structure for someone who wants to save to make a large purchase, 
except that they get to make the purchase when they fi rst join and are then 
committed to save. But it comes at the cost of a high interest rate. For many 
people who are not in any particular hurry to obtain the item they save for, 
the SHGs may be a much cheaper way to save.
The current paper focuses on characterizing which groups survive and 
which members exit the group. This is useful. It shows that generally the 
member who exits is not someone who fi nds better opportunity elsewhere, 
but rather is someone who does not fi nd an appropriate place in a group or 
someone whose group proves unsustainable. An exciting area of future re-
search would be to reframe the question a little, and provide more evidence 
on why groups persist despite the low levels of borrowing from bank. A richer 
description of what these groups do for their clients would be fascinating. It 
would also be interesting to know whether SHG clients continue to borrow 
from MFI or moneylenders, or whether the SHG does address their needs 
for fund. This paper is a great fi rst step in learning more about SHGs. One 
hopes that it will pave the way for many more in the same vein.
General Discussion
T.N. Srinivasan was concerned that the survival functions seemed to assume 
that survival was not affected by the sheer passage of time; to him it seemed 
likely that duration itself would be a determinant of survival. Anjini Kochar 
concurred, believing that the benefi ts expected by group members would be 
related to elapsed time, and that in this sense group membership and attri-
tion, were endogenous to the group.
Pranab Bardhan, like Esther Dufl o, was struck by the relatively low at-
trition rates. He speculated that this could refl ect self-selection in the for-
mation of the group. Group characteristics need not be a random refl ection 
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of the larger population. Bardhan also referred to work that he was currently 
doing on predictors of success of groups involved in collective management 
of environmental resources such as forests and fi sheries. His own attempt 
to capture the role of social heterogeneity had not been successful. He felt 
that the offi cially-defi ned sub-caste categories used in collecting the data 
were simply too broad, and he believed that some fi ner classifi cation (perhaps 
based on lineage) was needed.
Drawing further on his own work, Bardhan believed that it was import-
ant to examine the size of the group as a predictor of successful collective 
action. Theory was ambiguous on this point, while one might assume that 
smaller groups would be more cohesive, larger groups could be more ef-
fective in lobbying upper social layers. Other factors that he had found im-
portant were exit opportunities (proxied, for example by urban connections) 
and economic inequality. Finally his work also suggested that it was very 
important to know who defi nes the rules of functioning of the group. If the 
rules are defi ned by offi cials outside the group then group members do not 
feel bound by them and may indeed take perverse pleasure in violating them. 
In the present case, it would be useful to know which group rules, if any, 
were specifi ed by, say NABARD.
Responding to Esther Dufl o’s comment on relatively small loan sizes 
Dilip Mookherjee reported on the work that he and Bardhan had done on 
loans in West Bengal under the government’s Integrated Rural Develop-
ment Programme (IRDP). While average loan sizes were only of the order 
of Rs. 900, they still appeared to have a signifi cant impact on farm prod-
uctivity in later years. Turning to the paper, Mookherjee concurred with 
those who felt that the interesting object of the inquiry was less why people 
left groups and more what induced them to come together in the fi rst place. 
He cited his work with Banerjee, Munshi, and Ray with respect to the 
composition of sugar cooperatives in Maharashtra, where the relationship 
between heterogeneity, fractionalization, and survival was highly non-linear, 
depending on the balance of power between the larger and smaller land-
owners in the cooperative.
Mr Narendranath provided the perspective of PRADAN, the NGO that 
had organized the SHGs that were the subject of the survey. He noted that 
the formation of these groups was very far from being spontaneous, and 
depended on signifi cant and sustained outside intervention. He noted that 
in the Keonjarh district, for example, some of the tribals remained very forest 
dependent and practiced a form of farming which was close to slash and 
burn. Their entry into the monetary economy was still recent and tenuous; 
many of their transactions still took place through barter. This needed to be 
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taken into account in assessing the volume of credit activity. PRADAN saw 
its role as much wider than mere provision of credit; the issue was one of 
providing overall orientation and capacity building so that credit could be 
responsibly used. It was in this context that PRADAN organized exposure 
visits so that the groups could see how other, successful groups functioned. 
He also attributed the relatively low attrition rates to the amount of hand-
holding that PRADAN was willing to provide. His hunch was that in areas 
of India with more settled agriculture and an established tradition of SHGs, 
such as the south, attrition rates would indeed be higher.
Ritu Anand noted that subsidy from NABARD was only a part of the story, 
and not necessarily the largest part. Her employer, the State Bank of India 
(SBI), was the largest provider of funds to SHGs in the country, and the bulk 
of the subsidy came from cross-subsidy from other activities, rather than 
through refi nance by NABARD. She also noted that loan size was related 
both to level of individual saving, and to repayment record by the individual. 
As such, loan and savings size could be expected to grow over time.
Abhijit Banerjee thought the small size of loans was a sign that the re-
sources were not being used for asset creation: it was diffi cult to buy half a 
cow. In his view, it was also important to know who in the SHG made the 
lending decisions; it could be that the tribals left the SHGs because their 
loan requirements were not being met. He was also struck by the importance 
of at least one educated member in each group to conduct the minimal 
accounting functions.
Willem Buiter, the session chair, warned against assuming that dissolu-
tion of the group was necessarily a sign of failure. In this regard he wanted to 
know both what happened to members from dissolved groups, and whether 
it was possible for a newcomer to join an already established group. An 
offi cial of the SBI confi rmed that in his experience many of the smaller 
loans were taken to fi nance consumption. In his view, the major difference 
between the SHG model and its many government supported predecessors 
was the focus on group responsibility for repayment. This had resulted in 
far better repayment records and therefore greater sustainability than earlier 
schemes.
Anushree Sinha reported on work underway at NCAER that examined 
the reverse issue, namely factors explaining the sustainability of SHGs. 
Initial fi ndings also did not suggest that caste was a major factor in explain-
ing longevity; such early fi ndings suggested that it was important to get in-
formation from several members of the group, not just one or two. In her 
experience it was very diffi cult to get accurate information on groups that 
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had dissolved. Finally, she did believe that when individuals left groups, 
some at least migrated to other government credit programs.
In her response, Somanathan noted that this was the fi rst paper from a 
large dataset that was still being explored, and that some of the relevant in-
formation was still being entered. As Kletzer had correctly noted, the goal of 
this paper was to look carefully at one phenomenon, namely survival, which 
could only be explored by a dataset of this kind. Accordingly, the focus 
of the present paper was less on the benefi ts derived from participation in 
SHGs, but rather on the interplay between the group and the individual in 
duration and survival.
Within this limited scope, she agreed with many of the points made by 
the two discussants, and by the other participants. With respect to individual 
attrition she accepted that, in principle, the decision to stay with or leave 
a group was an individual decision, and in that sense might be seen as 
“optimal” from the individual’s perspective. But she also believed that there 
were circumstances under which the composition and behavior of the group 
impacted on the individual decision to leave, and she was concerned that 
it was the weaker members of the groups that tended to exit. With respect to 
groups as well, she cautioned against reading too much into the average 
numbers. Where groups were largely composed of primitive tribes, the failure 
rate was much higher than the norm. Such outliers were not well caught by 
regression equations but were important from a social policy point of view. 
Equally, for less advantaged groups such as these, she did not believe that 
SHGs were a transition to more independent forms of fi nancial linkage; it 
was more probable that people dropped out of formal fi nance completely.
Somanathan also clarifi ed how the data had been collected. Information 
had typically been gathered from each member in the group; where mem-
bers had left (for example, to get married in another village) the remaining 
members had been queried. In order to ensure full capture of group attrition, 
the areas surveyed had deliberately been selected as ones where PRADAN 
had begun its activities relatively recently and registers were complete. 
Equally in judging whether a group was “alive” a range of activities were 
tracked. Village level data had been gathered; when available, it could be used 
to judge how different groups were from the village population as a whole. 
The rules of the group were specifi ed by the group itself, with some support 
from PRADAN. She also clarifi ed that 20 percent of members who left a 
given group joined another group. So the fi gures for member exit covered 
those who had completely exited from the system.
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